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<CT>Sheltering Xenophobia
<CA>R. R. Sundstrom

<A>Introduction
Xenophobia rises.1 Never disappearing, it recedes from prominence, and makes regular
unwelcome returns. Unlike the proverbial unwanted guest who merely stays too long,
xenophobia terrifies the host with the possibility that it will never leave, and forever ruins
the act of hosting, sheltering, and giving sanctuary. Close the doors, give no shelter, tear
down the sanctuary: this is what the majority desires.2
The hospitable minority, for those whom hospitality is either a sacred or ethical
obligation or both, is overwhelmed by the masses’ noisy demands to shut the door. As if
that were not enough, the inhospitable, using the same holy and constitutional texts, glory
in denying sanctuary. They cry out in fear and worry that their country is being overrun,
that it is under siege, and that denying hospitality to threatening foreigners is right and
good. Foreigner hatred is justified and foreigner fear is embraced. Hence, the
organization “Stop Islamisation of Europe” (SIOE) declares: “Racism is the lowest form
of human stupidity, but Islamophobia is the height of common sense.”3
SIOE’s message is clear: racism is evil, Islamophobia is not racism, ergo
Islamophobia is not evil. This fallacious syllogism I call xenophobia’s double play: (1)
xenophobia is compared to superficial templates of racism, and then (2) justified as
nonracist. Racism is sidestepped, and xenophobia is eluded by its explicit absence.
Muslims are condemned as a historic, monolithic, and invariable threat against every
aspect of Western liberal democratic societies, and, thus, judged worthy of phobia.
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Indeed, Islamophobia is judged, in contrast with racism, to be reasonable and rational,
and the label “Islamophobe” is embraced as a rallying cry. Yet xenophobia lingers in the
structure of the term Islam + phobia. Muslims simply and terrifyingly are the xenos in
this instance. Moreover, and beyond this superficial syntactical similarity, the history of
xenophobia lingers in this example. Just as other ethnic, racial, and religious groups have
been demonized as a foreign, total threat, so do Muslims suffer this recent wave of fear
and hatred. Do not be fooled by the submergence of the general term xenos in SIOE’s
prideful slogan, Islamophobia is a form of xenophobia. SIOE’s blatant embrace of
xenophobia, moreover, is more than bold rhetoric: it is an act that is made possible by the
loss of meaning of the term xenophobia, and an accompanying diminishment of moral
outrage over xenophobic beliefs, attitudes, and acts.
To counter xenophobia, many fronts against it should be opened up: it should be
roundly denounced; social scientists should point out how peoples are pushed and pulled
across borders by the global capitalism and world politics; ethicists and political theorists
should debate the moral and political responsibilities that are generated toward
immigrants and refugees by those international forces; religious organizations should, as
acts of religious obedience and civil disobedience, provide sanctuary to immigrants and
refugees; and civil associations should work to counter the strong currents of inhospitality
that run through society.
To counter the dual loss—a loss of both meaning and moral judgment— around
the idea of xenophobia that SIOE and its ilk take advantage of, the idea of xenophobia
should be clarified and its moral status explained. That is the task in this piece, which
focuses on the question, how is xenophobia’s conceptual and moral meaning
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diminished—how is it sheltered? Investigations of such questions would invigorate
xenophobia as a topic in public morality and discourage the public’s acquiescence to
xenophobia’s new prominence. Related questions that should be investigated include,
what is xenophobia and what is its relation to racism and nativism? What are
xenophobia’s social and political harms? Xenophobia’s definition and relation to racism
and nativism is briefly addressed in the following section, and my answer to the question
of xenophobia’s social and political harms is indicated throughout the paper, but a
thorough answer to these questions is reserved for a separate treatment.4 In section 2 I
explain how theories of membership in liberal democratic societies relegate xenophobia
to a minor moral concern, and, in section three, that the conflation of xenophobia with
racism disadvantages the former. I claim that how liberal democratic nations imagine
membership (not surprisingly) and how those nations imagine racism (surprisingly)
shelters xenophobia.
<A>Xenophobia as Civic Ostracism
The core meaning of modern xenophobia is civic ostracism.5 Civic ostracism involves
exclusion, but also, as the term ostracism denotes, civic banishment: those who are within
the nation are regarded as not really belonging here, within the abstract, pure, or ideal
nation.6 It is a subjective belief or affect, usually from the perspective of an individual
who is, in their imagination, fully rooted in the nation, that some other person or group
cannot be a part of that nation. These strangers cannot be authentic participants of the
cultural, linguistic, or religious traditions of the nation they inhabit; they do not derive
from soil of the nation’s land or the blood of its people. The German word for such an
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outsider, ausländer, captures the social and political, as well as the geographic and
natality, senses of being an outsider to the land and its people.
This division between the insider and outsider of the nation is illuminated by
Jean-Paul Sartre’s insight that a division between the “real” and “abstract” nation ran
through French anti-Semitism.7 The division between those who “really” belong, and
those whose associations are merely abstract demonstrates the ontological arrogation of
xenophobia—it is a claim of separate fundamental, as well as social, being. One hand
there is the “real” nation that includes those with authentic claims bases on blood and
land, and on the other, there is the “abstract” whose belonging is mediated through law
and bureaucracy, and includes those whose links are not secured through blood or soil.
The world of the anti-Semite, or the xenophobe, is divided, and in Fanon’s formulation of
the colonial world, it is divided into compartments, such that even, or especially in
colonial zones, where colonial presence is implicitly violent, civic ostracism is enacted
and enforced.8
This division is illustrative of civic ostracism, and is connected to the related ideas
of “perpetual foreignness” or having a “probationary” belonging. The presence of some
groups within a nation is considered so inconsistent with the idea of the nation that their
foreignness seems perpetual, and if they are given an official status, then their belonging
is probationary, and dependent upon their assimilation.9 The stigma of perpetual
foreignness or being a probationary member of the nation is most often applied in the
United States to Asian Americans, Latinos, and increasingly Muslims, and peoples from
the Middle East, North Africa, or Southeast Asia, or in other words, people who are
presumed Arab or Muslims. This syndrome in turn illustrates corporeal malediction.10 It
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is a mismatch between one’s first-person experience of the body and the historical and
social meaning that is laden on it by one’s condition, circumstances, and society. In the
case of the perpetual foreigner, corporeal malediction involves important geographical,
linguistic, and cultural elements: they do not belong here.
Xenophobia is a general idea and is strongly related to the sometimes preferred
term, nativism. Nativism however is conceptually dependent on xenophobia and indicates
a positive political project to actively exclude or expel those judged to be too foreign to
belong, or to hoard the national community’s resources and keep them from being
exploited by foreigners. One can imagine, for example, groups within a nation, or even a
nomadic group, that expresses xenophobic attitudes without making specific nativist
claims. Whether, however, one uses “xenophobia” or “nativism” depends on the context
of the situation and the social-political practice and interests of organizations or
institutions being examined.
Just as xenophobia is distinct from nativism, it is also distinct from racism, and
this distinction, even when it is poorly made, allows for xenophobia’s double play and its
moral diminishment. Although the history between racism and xenophobia is deeply
intertwined, and instances of both are difficult to unravel from each other, there are
examples of each that need not involve the other. For example, an instance of racism
without xenophobia would involve some group, such as a national minority that clearly
belongs in the nation but are treated as racial outsiders by other dominant groups.
Xenophobia without racism would involve civic ostracism that targets some group within
the nation for their presumed nationality regardless of race. The rhetorical force of the
presumption that xenophobia can be separated from racism in arguments that are either
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anti-immigrant or for the limitation of immigration and refugee rights allows xenophobia
to be sheltered. One strategy to counter this is to emphasize the links between xenophobia
and racism. That makes historical and practical sense, but it has some shortcomings,
which I discuss below. I argue that in addition to anti-racist politics that rebut such
separation, that anti-xenophobic strategies be engaged.

<A>Nationalism Shelters Xenophobia
Nations assume a sovereign right to determine individual membership in their nations.
The rights of residency and citizenship are granted by nations to whom they judge meet
their constitutional criteria for either. This power is rooted in the idea of national selfdetermination—indeed it is the basis of the civic “self” that seeks political autonomy—
and is thus considered fundamental to national sovereignty. In the United States, the right
to determine membership is instantiated by the judicial branch’s granting of plenary
power to regulate immigration law to the executive and legislative branches.11
The sovereign right to determine membership is embedded in liberal political
theory: it is present at the constitutive, original moment (both the mythical monumental
historical and theoretical moments) of the social contract. This embedding is theoretical
justification, but this political founding myth is not the source of plenary power. The
source is in the assumption and assertion of national sovereignty over membership, and it
is backed up (to the degree that it can be, by the enforcement of immigration,
naturalization, and border security policy). Members of the social contract, through the
act of constituting the body politic, get to determine membership, with its rights, duties,
and obligations, in that body. A consequence of this political founding myth of self-
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constitution, is that social justice is defined as fair relations between members; it becomes
an intra-national idea, and is used, in ideal political theory, to judge and regulate the
effects of the basic structure of society on members, their life chances, and the
distribution of the benefits and burdens of society between members.12 Additionally, this
act of self-constitution, with the power of inclusion and exclusion, is credited with the
creation of communities of character and meaning: the emergence of a common form of
worship, languages, manners and mores, narratives and monuments, and virtues and
values.13
The sovereign right to determine membership alone creates many obstacles, some
justified (a fair and reasonably terminable immigration process) and many not (the
flouting of international laws and treaties governing migration), to would be refugees and
immigrants who are seeking shelter, a livelihood, and a guarantee that their basic human
rights will be honored.14 First, the dynamics of nationalism transforms whole territories—
enormous areas of land and collections of faiths, cultures, and languages—into ours and
not theirs. The nation state becomes concerned with inclusion and exclusion, with the
creation and division of friends from enemies.15 Second, it delimits social justice as an
intra-national idea. Third, immigrants, and those associated with immigrant communities,
including naturalized citizens or citizens ancestrally related to immigrant groups, are seen
as a threat to national communities of character and meaning.
This narrative is so powerful it has determined modern Western conceptions of
sanctuary and hospitality. Sanctuary and hospitality are no longer duties or obligations
derived from religious authority, moral or political theory, or social and environmental
conditions. No, instead they are now gifts and acts of charity. Nationalism, indeed, makes
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the modern concept of sanctuary, which is fundamentally incredible on a national scale,
credible. This is not the sanctuary of Abraham’s tent, or of a home, church or synagogue,
or community: it is the presumption that a vast nation—despite the massive pulls and
pushes of the world economy, and its self-interested geopolitical machinations—could
have the audacity to offer or, more often, deny, with a straight face, sanctuary to
“outsiders.”16 Additionally, in the years after 9-11, Americans’ frustration with
immigration from Mexico and Latin America combined with its fear of Arabs and
Muslims to further transform the idea of sanctuary from a moral burden to a threat to
national security. American cities that declared that they were “sanctuary cities” (local
officials, such as the police, would not inquire about the residency or citizenship status of
residents seeking municipal services) were accused of harboring criminals and potential
terrorists. Sanctuary is depreciated as a threat to the rule of law.17
What I have identified as the second obstacle, the delimitation, or distortion, of
social justice to an intra-national idea, has further negative effects. First, since the
ordering of the basic structure of society did not determine the beginning nor the progress
of the life of the refugee or immigrant, then (within the constraints of ideal political
theory) their life chances are not a matter of social justice. What has happened to them
may be a matter of international justice, but it is not the concern of social justice, and is
not a concern of “ours.”
This reasoning is similar to the reasoning of so-called “lifeboat ethics,” the idea
that each nation is like a lifeboat floating in the sea. Each lifeboat has a specific “carrying
capacity”—it can hold only so many people—and taking in more than it can hold will
sink the lifeboat and all its passengers. The moral of its story is that saving those in the
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water (or incautious sexual reproduction in the boat) endangers everyone else. The
proponents of lifeboat ethics say to those who want to extend sanctuary, “fine, but you
will have to make room for those you want to save by jumping overboard yourself!” The
unfortunates in the water are there presumably because they did not pay attention to the
carrying capacity of their own lifeboats, or their lifeboats were poorly captained; all the
same, we are not morally required to save them, because that would be akin to a moral
obligation to kill oneself. Of course, in this incredibly simple story, the lifeboats float in
one world, but do not have the complex global environmental, economic, political, and
social interrelations and interdependencies of actual nations on Earth.18 Our actual
cosmopolitan or global connections undermine the tenability of this thought experiment
and reveal it to be either irrelevant to our real conditions or a device in the service of
moral callousness.
The callousness of lifeboat ethics is the kind of moral disregard about noncitizens
that the delimitation of social justice gives rise to. Although the marginalization of
immigrants and refugees is mediated by constitutional law, and discouraged by the
cosmopolitan inclinations of some liberal theories,19 nonetheless, the message to citizens
is clear: their problems are not ours; as long as we did not push them into the sea, we do
not have to save them—let them drown.
The peril of drowning in some cases is literal; migrants from North Africa and the
Middle East attempt to boat into Spain and Malta, those from China and South Asia
attempt the same into Australia, and Haitians into the United States. A few members of
far-right parties want these boats sunk,20 but most citizens want the migrants detained off
shore without consideration of their suffering or legitimate claims for asylum. In the
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desert Southwest of the United States a similar story plays out, but, instead of drowning
in water, migrants are in danger of dying from the lack of it as they attempt to cross the
dangerous Sonoran desert. In response, Americans have supported stronger border
enforcement and crackdowns against undocumented Hispanic and Latino immigrants.
Moreover, apart the issues of border enforcement and deportation of undocumented
immigrants, Americans along the Arizona-Mexican border have even fiercely debated the
morality and legality of leaving water out for the desert-crossers so they do not die of
dehydration.21
The walls that shelter xenophobia within nations are made of callousness. A lack
of regard for the dignity of immigrants leaves them vulnerable to economic and political
exploitation and waves of xenophobic persecutions. The populace nurse xenophobic
attitudes, certain politicians and demagogues gain political capital from whipping up fear
and resentment toward perceived foreigners and immigrants, and some businesses (those
that take advantage of an underground economy of low-wage labor or are in the business
of detaining undocumented immigrants) profit from the ensuing heated, divisive
rhetoric—this was the process behind Arizona’s controversial immigration law, SB 1070,
which mandates that all municipal agents, mainly municipal and state police, enforce
federal immigration law by detaining undocumented immigrants.22
Callousness about the fate, livelihood, or rights of immigrants goes beyond them
to touch the lives of all that are perceived as foreigners. This includes naturalized
citizens, citizens with one immigrant parent who nevertheless gain citizenship through jus
sanguinis (the right of blood), and citizens who gain it through jus soli (the right of the
soil). Especially vulnerable are the native-born minor children of an immigrant or refugee
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whose access to the rights of citizenship and the benefits of society—and who would
rightfully and eventually take on the duties of adult citizenship—is imperiled by the
immigration or refugee status of their parents. In the United States, conservatives, a group
who typically regard the constitution as sacred and inalterable, seek to repeal the
Fourteenth Amendment’s implicit recognition of jus soli and provision of birthright
citizenship.
Blood and land, and, apparently, constitutional law, matter little when you look,
sound, or act like a foreigner. Xenophobic attitudes doom those citizens, who are
associated with foreignness, a group largely made up of ethnic, racial, and religious
minorities, to being perpetual foreigners and civic outsiders. Therefore, in the United
States, Mexican Americans are simply Mexicans, and Asian Americans are Asians. In
Germany, Turkish Germans are Turks. The Roma, in France and Italy, no matter their
residency status and despite European Union laws governing immigrations from member
states, are treated as simply Gypsies and expelled. Throughout the Eastern European
states and Middle East, Jewish citizens are simply Jews. Likewise, Muslim citizens in
Europe and America are simply Muslims. They are not us; they are aliens, ausländers,
perpetually foreign, and a foreign element, even an infection, in the body politic.
This puts in context the depth of the despair of German chancellor Angela
Merkel’s comments in Potsdam to her party members:
<EXT>We kidded ourselves awhile; we said, “They won’t stay, sometime
they’ll be gone.” But this isn’t reality. And of course the approach to build
a multicultural society—to happily live side by side with each other—this
approach has failed, utterly failed.23
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“We” and the “they”—there they are. It is almost incredible that the “they” she is
brazenly referring to includes citizens. The political leader of one of the major Western
liberal democratic nations, and Germany no less, is talking about her citizens—and their
civic belonging, their fundamental relation to the state as citizens—as if they were
separable from the civic we.24
Merkel’s comments demonstrate the awful power of the third obstacle created by
the sovereign right to determine membership: immigrants and citizens who are regarded
as perpetual foreigners are seen as a threat to national communities of character and
meaning. Her comments additionally illustrate how nationalism can nurture xenophobia.
It can encourage the development of both explicit prejudices and problematic implicit
attitudes against “foreigners.” When the conditions are right, liberal democratic societies
are hothouses for xenophobia, nurturing it from a sprout of an attitude to a blossom of
nativism, a fully developed political ideology. Moreover, apart from deeply committed
nativists, it can allow xenophobes to hide behind the claim that they do not wish
foreigners ill; rather they merely do not want them here. Nationalism shelters
xenophobia.25
<EXT>National Narratives of Racism Shelter Xenophobia
The attitudes of citizens toward noncitizens need not be negative, and indeed, Rawls
thinks that just societies should broadcast a healthy respect toward the citizens of other
nations as part of the comity of nations.26 The line, however, between citizen and
noncitizen, and the local emphasis on social justice, demotes concern with noncitizens in
political and ethical questions. Ethical cosmopolitans decry this demotion, and when such
denials of equal moral status appear to be based on race, ethnicity, or religion, then they
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are condemned as xenophobic, nativist, or racist. But xenophobia is a deep, endemic
problem; pointing to the specter of xenophobia or racism as warning is not sufficient.27
The relative weakness28 of xenophobia as a term of moral suasion is a tool in the
service of those already committed to apathy or to antipathy toward distant suffering
others, and the charge of racism against noncitizens can be easily deflected. Once
accusations of racism are evaded, charges of xenophobia offer little traction. This is how
that double play works: Xenophobia is rhetorically distinguished from racism, and is
therefore denied the analogical and metaphorical force that racism has in its various
national contexts. Drawing on well-known national narratives about racism, which in the
United States is influenced by the black/white binary,29 does not help since those
portrayals, with their particular contexts (e.g., the U.S. Civil Rights Movement), also
mark exploitable differences—this is the internal logic of the cynical strategy of
employing a nonwhite partisan, who is also clearly and enthusiastically a citizen, to
vouch for the nonracist credentials of the anti-foreigner organization (thus, the
significance of the black hand in SIOE’s logo). Such rejections of moral analogy between
xenophobia and racism should not be brushed off as mere rhetoric. It is effective rhetoric
that connects with other controversies over terms such as illegal alien or illegal
immigrant.30
This process is evident the example of the SIOE slogan discussed above. Their
website displays an image of a white hand shaking a black one, with acronym and the
phrase “against racism” framing the image. White and black: that is race is for SIOE and
racism is the rejection of a group because of apparent color differences. Their complaint
against Islam, in contrast, is based in their belief that Islam is violently incompatible with
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democracy, and that Muslims are engaged in a cultural takeover of European civilization.
This allows room for the SIOE, and its variations across Europe and the United States, to
make the claim that if they are not racist, then their xenophobia is a product of common
sense—the desire to protect your life and way of life is rational, and fears about the
theological-political-cultural threat of Islam are reasonable.
There are many responses to SIOE’s depiction of race and racism—it exploits
naïve biological views of race, it is cynical, and plainly self-serving—yet, it displays my
basic point: xenophobia does not look like racism, as we have imagined it through our
national narratives. SIOE uses nationalism and national conceptions of racism to shelter
their xenophobia. This sheltering of xenophobia through the process of rhetorically
separating xenophobia from racism is a straightforward example of how the black/white
binary skews discussions of racism and may even aid in the moral diminution of
xenophobia. The black-white binary, as I have defined it, is a complex set of at least six
ideas about the dominant roles of white and black in the U.S. racial system, hierarchy,
and history. The black/white binary is imagined to be a master key to all things racial. It
is a key to open up a nation’s racial history and problems, and is central to any potential
solution to those problems. Although SIOE’s distinguishing of xenophobia from racism is
a transnational instance of the black/white binary in operation, it dovetails with the
particular national narratives of racism where versions of the black-white binary have
guided popular conceptions of racism. The image that SIOE employed clearly
participates in the second form of the black/white binary, which states that, “racial
patterns can be empirically described solely using black and white terms.”31 Their naïve
description of antiracism through the visual representation of clasped black and white
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hands, and the implied conception of racism as simply prejudice against skin color as a
mark of visually evident racial difference, metaphorically monopolizes the meaning of
racism.
Perhaps I have surrendered too easily to SIOE’s dichotomy. A critic could argue
that instead of accepting a distinction between xenophobia and racism, one should reject
the second premise of SIOE’s argument: “Islamophobia is not racism.” That may be a
reasonable strategy. Early chapters of the history of racism involve similar attitudes and
beliefs about both Muslims and Jews. During the years of the Spanish inquisition and the
spread of anti-Semitism through Europe, from the fifteenth through the eighteen
centuries, Muslims and Jews were targeted by a deadly mix of beliefs: they practiced a
faith opposed to the “true-faith” of Christianity, when they did convert they did so
falsely, they were agents of the devil, they were carriers or even instigators of disease and
ruin, the souls and character of these peoples were marked by God for punishment and
subservience, they were incapable of being civilized, and so on: they were tainted by the
mark of Ham. 32 A similar process has occurred with particular instances of xenophobia,
such as Islamophobia: it blends cultural prejudices against Muslims and Islamic, Arab,
and Middle Eastern–associated cultures; it demonizes and reduces them to a cultural
threat to the West or as potential terrorists; and through those processes it ends up
racializing Arabs, Muslims, Middle Easterners, and those falsely associated with them,
such as Sikhs.33 This history is not to be denied but drawing on that history is not enough;
the civic ostracism in the core of this xenophobia needs singling out. As blatantly selfserving as the SIOE slogan is, it displays how xenophobia-inspired civic ostracism is not

R.R.Sundstrom

16

based in race per se, and how xenophobia does not look like racism as it has been
imagined through national narratives. National narratives of racism shelter xenophobia.

<A>Conclusion
Nationalism shelters xenophobia and so do national narratives of racism. Together they
operate to perform xenophobia’s double play, which has been used to keep the moral
status of xenophobia as wrong diminished. In those few cases where xenophobia is
clearly identified as condemnable, usually after a world-historical event or moment that
brings the rights of excluded others to high relief (e.g., the fall of Nazi Germany, the U.S.
Civil Rights Movement, or the end of South African apartheid) the double play reenters
the national drama to again justify the exclusion of some targeted group.
Vigilance, as they say, against these exclusions is in constant need. Xenophobia
should be denied sanctuary. It should be chased out of from behind its nationalist mask,
and its co-optation of nationalized antiracist rhetoric. Pro-immigration activism and
migrant advocates in the United States have, using a variety of strategies, done and
continue to do this work, but xenophobia as a target of critique should not be obscured
among in general anti-racist rhetoric. Xenophobia should be, in addition to racism or
racial or ethnocentric bias be identified and condemned, and its particular harms against
documented and undocumented immigrants, but also citizens who are presumed-aliens,
should be identified. Ignoring xenophobia for the sake of a unified, or monisitc, antiracist
rhetoric plays into xenophobia’s double play. It also underplays how xenophobia directly
affects, not only documented and undocumented immigrants, but also citizens who are
presumed-aliens.
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Although xenophobia is conceptually prior to nativism and in need of particular
attention to counter its rise, I do not argue that the term xenophobia should be preferred
across all contexts and groups over the utilization of the terms racism and nativism. My
argument that xenophobia needs to be distinguished from racism and nativism is
motivated by its particulars and likewise by the particular needs of groups affected by it.
The particularism of this approach is joined with an equal appreciation for
methodological pluralism. Given the particularism and pluralism of this investigation, I
am reticent to insist that xenophobia is the one true label for beliefs, attitudes, and actions
that involve civic ostracism. Political theorists, and more so philosophers, are no position
to pontificate on what is or is not proper usage of crucial meaning-laden terms in the
context of real social and political struggles. Fanon’s stinging critique of professors of
ethics is apropos of this situation:
<EXT>For a colonized people the most essential value, because of the
most concrete, is first and foremost the land: the land which will bring
them bread and, above all, dignity. But this dignity has nothing to do with
the dignity of the human individual: for that human individual has never
heard tell of it. All that the native has seen in his country is that they can
freely arrest him, beat him, starve him: and no professor of ethics, no
priest has ever come to be beaten in his place, nor to share their bread with
him. As far as the native is concerned, morality is very concrete.34</EXT>

Fanon critiqued an abstract humanism that was a weapon in the hands of French
colonialism, and, in contrast, he brought our attention to the concrete conditions of
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colonial oppression. His particularism influences this analysis of xenophobia, and so does
his injunction that while the role of political theorists is to critique, they should do so
with a listening ear to those who suffer the oppression, in this case xenophobia, that they
are attempting to analyze. This analysis, therefore, is meant to be consistent with a broad
array of anti-racist and anti-xenophobic strategies utilized in the effort to deny
xenophobia shelter.
Notes
1. This paper benefited from generous and critical comments from audiences at the
University of Minnesota at Duluth in 2009 and at Penn State’s Rock Ethics Institute’s
conference on “Critical Philosophy of Race: Intersections with Culture, Ethnicity, and
Nationality Beyond the Black/White Binary,” in 2010. The ideas in this paper were
formed through many conversations with David H. Kim and are reflected in our
coauthored essay “Xenophobia and Racism” (forthcoming, Critical Philosophy of Race).
An abbreviated version of this paper appeared as Ronald R. Sundstrom, "Sheltering
Xenophobia," Global Dialogue 12, no. 2 (2010),
http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=481. [AU: Just fyi, per Press style,
access dates will not be included. DC]
2. Does the majority always desire this? That is a good question, however, it is not the
one I address here. This paper focuses on modern state-centered or even state-sponsored
xenophobia. My point is that in our present, post-9-11 world, majorities in various
nations have supported the exclusion of immigrants and those associated with
immigration. For example, polls by the Pew Center for Research and the Press
determined that a majority of Americans support the State of Arizona’s controversial
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anti-immigration laws, and are conflicted about Islam and the role of Muslims in U.S.
society. See “Public Supports Arizona Immigration Law,”
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1591/public-support-arizona-immigration-law-poll; and
“Public Remains Conflicted Over Islam,”http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1706/pollamericans-views-of-muslims-object-to-new-york-islamic-center-islam-violence. My
narrow claim aside, xenophobia has had a long presence in the historical record. For an
evolutionary approach to this issue see, Peter Turchin, War and Peace and War: The Life
Cycles of Imperial Nations (New York: Pi Press, 2006). See also, Arne Roets and Alain
Van Hiel, "Allport's Prejudiced Personality Today: Need for Closure as the Motivated
Cognitive Basis of Prejudice," Current Directions in Pyschological Science 20, no. 6
(2011). Roets and Van Hiel argue that prejudice is often motivated by the psychological
need to make quick judgments rather than ideology. Whether xenophobia is rational
depends on psychological and game-theoretical facts that are not the focus of this paper.
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